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I
nternational trade data record the gross value of goods as they cross borders. 
This poses a challenge for researchers who want to connect canonical interna-
tional trade and macroeconomic models, which are typically cast in value-added 
terms, with the data. The most common approach has been to treat gross trade 
data as if it is comparable to data on value added. In the past, this assumption was 
tolerable. Vertical specialization in trade—that is, the use of imports to produce 
exports—was limited in most countries (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001). In other 
words, gross exports contained very nearly 100 percent domestic value added.
In recent decades, the emergence of global supply chains has changed matters. 
As inputs pass through these chains, they cross borders many times. This means 
that gross trade data include substantial double-counting, so gross exports overstate 
the amount of domestic value-added in exports. When supply chains span multiple 
countries, it also means that bilateral gross exports do not tell us where the value 
added embodied in those exports is ultimately consumed. As a result, gross trade is 
an increasingly misleading guide to how value added is exchanged between countries.
This realization has prompted concerns that gross trade data distort percep-
tions about the nature of international integration and the role of particular 
countries in international markets, which in turn leads to tensions in the world trade 
system. Lamy (2011), for example, emphasizes that a clearer view of how countries 
are linked together via global supply chains breaks down mercantilist (“us” versus 
“them”) views of trade. Prompted by these real world concerns, along with the 
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desire to measure trade in a manner consistent with the value-added thinking that 
underlies popular models, there has been a recent push toward developing new 
value-added measures of trade.
To measure trade in value added, we need to follow goods through the global 
supply chain from input producers to fi nal consumers, allocating the value added 
in fi nal goods to producers at each stage. Of course, this is easier said than done. 
While national input-output accounts describe domestic supply chains, they stop 
at the border. To overcome this problem, recent work has combined national 
input-output tables with bilateral trade data to construct input-output tables with 
global scope. These global input-output tables describe input shipments across both 
sectors and countries, and hence enable us to trace the value added embodied in 
fi nal goods back to its source. With this new data, we can measure the hidden trade 
in value added underlying gross trade.
In this paper, I highlight one measure of trade in value added—“value-added 
exports.” Value-added exports measure the amount of domestic value added embodied 
in fi nal expenditure in each destination ( Johnson and Noguera 2012a). Just as gross 
exports break down gross output sold across destinations, value-added exports break 
down GDP sold across destinations. This value-added export concept is the appropriate 
measure of exports in international models that are written in value-added terms.
After describing how value-added exports are computed, I summarize fi ve key 
facts about differences between gross and value-added exports. First, these differences 
are large and growing over time, currently around 25 percent. Second, manufacturing 
trade looks more important (relative to services) in gross than value-added terms. 
Third, these differences are heterogenous across countries, with value-added exports 
ranging from 50 percent (Taiwan) to 90 percent (Russia) of gross exports. Fourth, the 
differences between gross and value-added exports are heterogeneous across bilateral 
partners, with even more variation across partners than across individual countries. 
Fifth, these differences are changing unevenly over time across countries and part-
ners, with fast-growing emerging markets and pairs of countries that adopt bilateral 
trade agreements seeing larger declines in value-added relative to gross exports.
Taking these fi ve facts into account points researchers toward better quantitative 
answers to important macroeconomic and trade questions. To illustrate this point, 
I discuss how value-added exports can be applied in analysis of some widely discussed 
questions. In macroeconomics, value-added exports help quantify the strength of 
demand spillovers, the consequences of relative price movements for competitive-
ness, and the size of relative price changes needed to close trade imbalances. In trade, 
value-added exports can be applied in analysis of the impact of frictions on trade, the 
role of endowments and comparative advantage in trade, and trade policy.
Background: Computing Value-Added Exports
A basic fact of national income accounting is that expenditure on fi nal goods 
equals the amount of value added generated during the production process. 
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Therefore, fi nal expenditure directly tells us how much value added is consumed 
in each country. But the national accounts do not tell us where that value added 
comes from.
For specifi c goods (like iPods or notebook PCs), we can try to decompose the 
value added embodied in them across countries by breaking them apart and exam-
ining their constituent parts (Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2009; Debrick, Kraemer, 
and Linden 2010). This deconstructive approach is conceptually straightforward, 
but complicated in practice. One reason is that the production process has many 
layers. It is not enough to break the iPod into component parts (for example, the 
screen, disk drive, plastic shell); one needs to also break down those components 
into subcomponents (metal, plastic, and so on). Pushing further, even the subcom-
ponents need to be further broken down until one knows where the value added in 
the metal, plastic, and other basic inputs originates.
The goal of this process is to be able to make statements like “one third of the 
$299 value of an iPod sold in the United States is Japanese value added.” 1 Though 
this value added is produced in Japan, it is consumed in the United States. As a 
matter of defi nition, we then say that Japan exports roughly $100 of value added to 
the United States as part of the iPod production process.
Implementing this approach on a good-by-good basis and then aggregating up 
to produce aggregate value-added export data is nigh impossible. Nonetheless, the 
basic logic of this good-by-good calculation can be adapted to track value added in 
the aggregate. To see this, it is useful to think of the process in two steps.
The fi rst step is to measure how much output from each source country is 
needed to produce the fi nal goods that are consumed in a given destination. For 
example, how much Japanese gross output (disk drives, metal, and everything else) 
is needed to produce fi nal goods (iPods) consumed in the United States? In this 
step, we need to know not only how many Japanese disk drives are used, but also 
how much Japanese metal and plastic are used in production of those disk drives.
The second step is to measure how much local value added is generated in 
production of that gross output. That is, how much Japanese value added is gener-
ated in assembling the disk drives, plus how much Japanese value added is embodied 
in the metal used?
To implement this two-step  approach economy-wide, we need to describe 
the sector-level production process in a manner analogous to how we described the 
production process for individual goods. That is, we need to measure the value 
of fi nal goods purchased from each source country and measure input use and 
value-added contributions along the production chain. To do this, we turn to a 
1 This estimate is based on Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick (2009). It is the value of iPod components 
from Japanese-headquartered companies (for example, the hard drive from Toshiba) divided by the 
sales price of the iPod. However, this estimate does not actually measure true value added by Japanese 
suppliers. First, it does not identify where Toshiba produces the hard drive, which determines the country 
in which value added is recorded. Second, it only captures the last layer of the production process. For 
example, it does not identify whether Toshiba uses imported inputs to produce the hard drive. To my 
knowledge, no product case study has yet been able to address these problems.
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global input-output framework. On the input side, global input-output tables record 
the sectors and countries from which inputs are sourced to produce output in a 
given country and sector. On the output side, they record the destinations to which 
fi nal goods from each sector are shipped. Combining these, we can take fi nal goods 
shipments and trace backwards using input requirements to allocate the value added 
in those fi nal goods to their source.
For example, suppose we see fi nal goods being shipped from US manufac-
turers to Canadian fi nal consumers. Then, if we know the sector and country origin 
of inputs used in US manufacturing (for example, inputs from Japan used in US 
manufacturing), this is analogous to knowing the iPod’s components. Building on 
this, if we also know where those input suppliers get their own inputs (for example, 
inputs from China used by Japan), this is analogous to knowing the breakdown 
of components into subcomponents. Further, the input-output accounts record 
how much value added is generated in producing output in each country and 
sector, which enables us to convert gross production at each stage to value added. 
In this way, applying input-output accounting principles, we approximate the iPod 
accounting exercise for the economy as a whole.2
The main challenge in implementing this approach lies in assembling the data 
needed to form the global input-output framework. In an ideal world, national 
statistical authorities would coordinate to produce these input-output accounts. 
As a second best, various researchers and organizations have assembled synthetic 
input-output tables from existing national accounts and trade data. The basic proce-
dure uses bilateral trade data to split sector-level multilateral fi nal and intermediate 
goods imports, which are reported in offi cial input-output tables, across source 
countries. The result is a global input-output table, which describes bilateral fi nal 
and intermediate input use. Table 1 lists several public use datasets that contain 
national input-output tables, global or regional input-output tables, or value-added 
trade data.
Not surprisingly, different research teams have used varying data sources and 
assumptions in constructing these global input-output tables. I will not dwell here 
on the many different choices that have been made by various researchers. Rather, 
I want to highlight that there is tremendous agreement across alternative data 
sets about how value-added exports compare to gross exports. The core facts that 
I discuss below are robust across alternative datasets.
2 To sketch the underlying math, suppose we observe a global input-output matrix, denoted A, which is 
a square matrix of input use requirements with dimensions equal to the number of countries times the 
number of sectors. The columns of this matrix describe input requirements for producing gross output 
in each country and sector, with elements equal to the value of inputs purchased from a particular source 
country and sector as a share of gross sector-level output in the destination. The “Leontief inverse” of 
the global input-output matrix, given by (I − A ) −1 , tells us how much output from each source country 
and sector is needed to produce any vector of fi nal goods, where fi nal goods are identifi ed by sector and 
country source. To convert these gross output requirements into value added, multiply by value added to 
output ratios in the source country and sector, which can be obtained by taking one minus the column 
sums of A. See Johnson and Noguera (2012a) for details.
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 Five Facts about Value-Added Exports
This section reviews fi ve high-level facts about how value-added exports 
compare to gross exports for the world as a whole, across sectors, across countries, 
and across bilateral trade partners.
Fact 1: World value-added exports are equal to about 70–75 percent of gross exports today, 
down from about 85 percent in the 1970s and 1980s.
Recent estimates suggest that value-added exports are equal to 70–75 percent 
of the value of gross exports. Using the World Input-Output Database, the ratio of 
value-added to gross exports was about 0.71 in 2008. Johnson and Noguera (2014) 
put it at about 0.76 in the same year. Johnson and Noguera (2012a) report that the 
median ratio of value-added to gross exports across 94 countries was 0.73 in 2004. 
Despite differences in underlying data and methods, these estimates lie within a 
comfortingly narrow range.
Table 1
Public Datasets for Research on Value-Added Exports
Name of dataset Key features Selected research using this data
Global Trade Analyis 
Project Database
Input-output tables for over 
100 countries for various benchmark 
years, mostly after 2000. https://
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu
Trefl er and Zhu (2010), Daudin, 
Riffl art, and Schweisguth (2011), 
Johnson and Noguera (2012a), and 
Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014)
World Input-Output 
Database
Global tables covering OECD 
countries and major emerging 
markets from 1995–2011. 
http://www.wiod.org
Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzales (2013), 
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), 




Regional tables covering 8 East 
Asian countries at fi ve-year intervals 
between 1985 and 2000. 
http://www.ide.go.jp
Various chapters in Hiratsuka and 
Uchida (2010), IDE-JETRO and WTO 
(2011), Puzzello (2012)
WTO-OECD TiVA 
Database (Trade in 
Value Added)
Value-added exports and other 
measures of global supply chain 
activity for 57 countries in 1995, 
2000, 2005, 2008 and 2009. 
http://stats.oecd.org
De Backer and Miroudot (2013)
OECD Input-Output 
Tables
Input-output tables for OECD 
countries and major emerging 
markets, available various years from 
1970–2005. http://www.oecd.org
/trade/input-outputtables.htm
Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), 
Johnson and Noguera (2012b, 2014)
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The ratio of value-added to gross trade has declined over time, down from 
around 85 percent in the early 1970s ( Johnson and Noguera 2014). This decline 
implies that there is more double counting in gross trade data now than in the 
past. This increased double counting is symptomatic of the growing importance 
of global supply chains in mediating trade, as goods cross borders more than once 
when supply chains span multiple countries.3
One important feature of the data is that the decline in value-added relative to 
gross exports occurs almost entirely after 1990 ( Johnson and Noguera 2014). This 
decline coincides with rapid changes in the world economy: trade liberalization in 
emerging markets, the expansion of the European Union, the adoption of major 
regional trade agreements, and the information technology revolution. Writ large, 
these events lowered international trade costs, induced substitution of foreign for 
domestic input suppliers, and drove down the value-added content of trade.
Fact 2: Manufacturing trade is relatively smaller, and services trade relatively larger, when 
measured in value-added terms.
For the world as a whole, manufacturing accounts for nearly 70 percent, and 
services account for 20 percent, of total gross exports. In contrast, manufacturing 
and services both account for about 40 percent of total value-added exports. This 
reallocation of trade shares is illustrated in Figure 1.
Put differently, the ratio of value-added to gross exports is lower for manufac-
turing than services trade. There are two reasons for this. First, gross manufacturing 
exports include value added from the services sector, because manufacturing fi rms 
buy services as inputs. The value-added export data strip this services value added 
out of manufacturing exports and reassign it to the services sector. Second, manu-
facturing features a higher degree of vertical specialization than services (that is, a 
higher import content of exports), which pushes down the ratio of value-added to 
gross exports in manufacturing relative to other sectors.
Fact 3: Across countries, value-added exports range from 50 to 90 percent of the value of 
gross exports.
There is wide variation across countries in the ratio of value-added to gross 
exports. Table 2 reports the ratio of value-added to gross exports in 2008 for the 
top 20 exporting countries, computed using the World Input-Output Database. 
Among these countries, the range is roughly 0.5 to 0.9. Using a broader 89 country 
sample from the Global Trade Analysis Project database, in Johnson and Noguera 
(2012a), we document a 10th–90th percentile spread of about 0.6 to 0.85 in 2004.
3 Fally (2012) shows that the inverse of the world value-added to gross export ratio can be interpreted as 
a weighted average count of the number of border crossings associated with producing $1 of fi nal goods, 
where the weights refl ect the value added by each country.
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Among other determinants, the ratio of value-added to gross exports is strongly 
negatively correlated with the share of manufacturing in total exports ( Johnson and 
Noguera 2012a). This observation relates back to Fact 2. The ratio of value-added 
to gross exports is lowest in manufacturing, so the composition of trade matters.
Fact 4: Gaps between bilateral value-added and gross exports are large and heterogeneous 
across trade partners.
Table 3 reports the ratio of value-added to gross exports for the top four export-
ing countries for alternative destination countries and composite regions. Though 
regional aggregation obscures many interesting bilateral details, it serves to highlight 
some key aspects of the data.
First, there is as much variation across bilateral partners as there is across 
source countries. For Germany, the ratio of value-added to gross exports ranges 
Figure 1
Sector Shares in Total World Value-Added and Gross Exports
Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and author’s calculations.
Notes: Data are for 2008. Agriculture includes Forestry, Hunting, and Fishing. Non-Manufacturing 
Industrial Production includes Mining and Quarrying, Electricity/Gas/Water Supply, and Construction. 
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from 0.6 to 1 across destinations. Second, value-added exports to some destinations 
exceed gross exports. For example, Japanese value-added exports to the United 
States are 7 percent larger than their gross exports. This refl ects the fact that Japan 
exports intermediate goods to third countries (such as China) that then re-exports 
those intermediates to the United States embodied in fi nal goods. Third, the ratio 
of value-added to gross exports tends to be lower within regions or regional trade 
agreement blocs than across them. For example, US value-added exports are 
64 percent as large as gross exports to Mexico and Canada, while US value-added 
exports are about 90  percent as large as gross exports to the European Union 
or Japan. Similar patterns hold for Japan and Germany among their Asian and 
European Union partners, respectively.
Table 2







Germany 0.69 −0.10 −0.16
United States 0.78 −0.05 −0.14
China 0.75 −0.09 −0.20
Japan 0.80 −0.12 −0.09
United Kingdom 0.78 −0.01 −0.04
France 0.71 −0.08 −0.13
Italy 0.73 −0.07 −0.12
Netherlands 0.62 −0.06 −0.11
Canada 0.76 0.02 −0.11
South Korea 0.58 −0.18 −0.18
Russia 0.92 0.00
Belgium 0.53 −0.07 −0.15
Spain 0.69 −0.09 −0.17
Taiwan 0.51 −0.16
Mexico 0.70 −0.03 −0.21
India 0.78 −0.12 −0.20
Sweden 0.66 −0.08 −0.13
Australia 0.84 −0.04 −0.06
Brazil 0.86 −0.05 −0.10
Austria 0.65 −0.10 −0.17
Minimum 0.51 −0.18 −0.21
Median 0.72 −0.08 −0.14
Maximum 0.92 0.02 −0.04
Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and author’s calculations, Johnson and Noguera (2014). 
Notes: The column “WIOD 2008” is the ratio of value-added exports to gross exports for each country in 
2008 from the World Input-Output Database. The column “WIOD change 1995–2008” is the change 
in this ratio from 1995 to 2008. The column “Johnson–Noguera change 1970–2008” is the change in 
the ratio of value-added exports to gross exports for each country from 1970 to 2008, from Johnson and 
Noguera (2014). Blank entries in that column refl ect missing data. Exporting countries are ordered top 
to bottom by total gross exports in 2008.
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Fact  5: Changes in value-added relative to gross exports have been heterogeneous across 
countries and bilateral trade partners.
Table 2 also reports changes in the ratio of value-added to gross exports for each 
of the top 20 exporters for two time periods. Column 2 records the change in this 
ratio over the 1995–2008 period, while column 3 records changes over the longer 
1970–2008 period. To summarize, some countries have seen declines on the order 
of 20 percentage points, while others have seen no change—or even increases. In 
general, declines have been larger in fast-growing emerging markets than other 
countries, largely due to the rapid increase in the share of manufactures in their 
gross exports over time ( Johnson and Noguera 2014).
Drilling down to the bilateral level, changes in the ratio of value-added to gross 
exports are also very different across bilateral trade partners. One stylized fact is 
that the ratio has declined more for nearby countries and countries within the same 
region ( Johnson and Noguera 2012b, 2014). A second fact is that the ratio has 
declined more for countries that have adopted regional trade agreements with one 
another ( Johnson and Noguera 2014).
 International Macroeconomics
Using value-added export data in place of gross exports sheds new light on 
some old questions in international macroeconomics. Here, I consider three of 
those questions. First, how large are the spillover effects of changes in foreign 
fi nal expenditure on domestic economic activity? Second, how do international 
relative price changes—for example, due to exchange rate movements—infl uence 
competitiveness? Third, how large must price changes be in order to close 
trade imbalances?
Table 3
Ratio of Bilateral Value-Added to Gross Exports for Top 4 Exporting Countries










China 0.84 0.71 0.79 0.73 0.52 0.73
Germany 0.99 0.80 0.60 0.77 1.00 0.70 0.74
Japan 1.07 0.86 1.06 0.69 0.53 0.76
United States 0.64 0.87 0.83 0.91 0.69 0.79
Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and author’s calculations.
Notes: Data are for 2008. “Other Asia” includes Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan. “Other” includes 
all other destinations not listed in table.
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 Tracking Foreign Expenditure Changes Back Home
How much does US GDP fall when foreign fi nal expenditure falls? Would the 
US economy be hit harder by a fall in expenditure in Italy or Canada? To answer 
these questions, analysts traditionally look at US gross exports, and assume that 
those exports are produced entirely within the United States. They use the share 
of multilateral or bilateral exports in GDP to summarize the exposure of the 
US economy to foreign expenditure changes.
A value-added perspective on trade highlights several fl aws in this approach. 
First, a dollar of US exports does not generate a dollar of US value added. As a 
result, the ratio of exports to GDP will overstate how much GDP falls when exports 
decline. Second, bilateral gross exports do not capture how much value added the 
United States sells in particular destinations. For example, a signifi cant share of US 
exports to Canada are used to produce Canadian goods consumed in the United 
States, so gross exports overstate US exposure to Canadian demand shocks. Alter-
natively, gross exports may understate exposure in other cases. For example, the 
US exports inputs to Germany that are used to produce German goods consumed 
in Italy. Thus, the US economy is more exposed to changes in Italian demand than 
gross exports would indicate.
Looking directly at value-added exports side-steps these problems. Value-added 
exports directly link foreign fi nal expenditure to demand for domestic value added, 
removing gross exports as the “middle man” in the calculation. Though this intuition 
is straightforward, explaining how it emerges directly from standard macro-models 
takes some additional effort. There are two alternative theoretical approaches.
The fi rst approach is to write down the model entirely in value-added terms, 
ignoring trade in intermediate inputs entirely. Though this approach may initially 
sound strange, it is in fact completely standard—for example, the canonical inter-
national real business cycle fi ts this description (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland 
1994). On the supply side, producers combine primary factors (labor and capital) 
to produce value added. On the demand side, consumers directly purchase and 
consume value added originating from different source countries. Given this struc-
ture, value-added exports are the appropriate data to use in measuring trade and 
calibrating preference parameters.4 And the share of bilateral value-added exports 
in total value added is the appropriate weight to use in estimating how much demand 
for domestic value added falls in response to changes in foreign fi nal expenditure.
The second approach is to embrace input trade, and write down the model 
in gross terms (Ambler, Cardia, and Zimmerman 2002; Johnson forthcoming). 
In this case, producers would combine primary factors with intermediate inputs 
to produce gross output, which may be dedicated to either fi nal or intermediate 
use. And preferences would be defi ned over consumption of fi nal goods. In Bems 
4 This observation is closely related to a recent point raised by Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi 
(2013). In a closed economy, they argue that expenditure on value added from each sector, rather than 
expenditure on fi nal goods from each sector, should be used to calibrate preferences in multisector 
models that feature value-added production functions for sectoral output.
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and Johnson (2012), we show that value-added export shares are the appropriate 
weights to attach to foreign fi nal expenditure changes in this type of model as well.5
Using value-added exports in place of gross exports has three implications. First, 
all countries appear less exposed to foreign expenditure changes, many substan-
tially so. Remember, the ratio of value-added to gross exports is less than one, and 
these adjustments are getting larger over time due to declines in value-added to 
export ratios. Second, at the sector-level, the manufacturing sector looks substan-
tially less exposed, and nonmanufacturing sectors look substantially more exposed 
to foreign shocks, because manufacturing exports are smaller and services exports 
larger in value-added terms. Third, the importance of shocks originating in partic-
ular export destinations differs—with some countries becoming more important, 
while others are becoming less important, than one would guess based on gross 
bilateral exports. This follows from differences in bilateral value-added to export 
ratios across partners.
To illustrate the magnitude of these adjustments, I graph the ratios of gross and 
value-added exports to GDP for the top four exporters in Figure 2. Aggregating across 
sectors, the ratio of value-added exports to GDP is generically smaller than the ratio 
of gross exports to GDP. At the sector level, the ratio of value-added exports from 
the manufacturing sector to manufacturing GDP is dramatically smaller than the 
ratio of gross exports from the manufacturing sector to manufacturing GDP, about 
half as large for these countries. Further, differences in openness across sectors 
are reduced when measured using the ratio of value-added exports to GDP, rather 
than the ratio of gross exports to GDP. Manufacturing openness drops a lot, and 
nonmanufacturing openness rises (doubling in three of the four countries). This 
convergence in measured openness will be important below in thinking through 
the mechanics of trade balance adjustment.6
Turning to bilateral data, there are also differences between bilateral value-added 
versus gross exports to GDP ratios, particuarly for manufacturing. For the United 
States, the ratio of bilateral gross manufacturing exports to manufacturing GDP 
is about 0.17 for Canada and only .07 for value-added exports. For exports to the 
European Union, the comparable fi gures are 0.11 for gross exports and 0.06 for 
value-added exports. Therefore, while Canada looks like a more important export 
destination in gross terms, the European Union is equally important when we focus 
on how much US value added is actually being consumed in each country. The 
reason, of course, is that so much of US gross exports to Canada are embodied in 
Canadian exports back to the US economy. These value-added adjustments should 
be taken into account in evaluating the strength of bilateral demand linkages.
5 In Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2010, 2011), we use a Leontief assumption to derive the same result from 
a global input-output accounting framework. This is a special case of the more general model in Bems 
and Johnson (2012).
6 In the absence of value-added trade data, one might be tempted to use the ratio of gross exports to 
gross output in calibrating openness. This is not only wrong in theory, it is also troublesome in practice 
because it makes the economy and individual sectors look too closed. For example, the aggregate ratio 
of gross exports to gross output in China is 0.11, less than half the ratio of value-added exports to GDP.
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Figure 2
Aggregate and Sector-Level Openness for Top Four Exporting Countries
Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and author’s calculations.
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 Relative Price Changes and Competitiveness
How do changes in relative prices infl uence demand for value added from 
particular source countries? For example, how much would a reminbi apprecia-
tion lower demand for Chinese value added? What about if the reminbi appreciates 
against the yen, but holds its value against the dollar? How should we aggregate those 
heterogenous bilateral relative price changes to evaluate Chinese competitiveness?
The answers to these questions can be somewhat different depending on 
whether one takes a value-added or conventional view of trade. For example, 
suppose the renminbi appreciates (against all countries) and factor prices in all 
countries are fi xed in producer currencies. How much this appreciation raises the 
relative price of Chinese exports depends on how much Chinese value added is 
embodied in them. Since China imports intermediate inputs to produce exports, 
China’s export price depends on both the price of Chinese and foreign value 
added. As a result, a lower value-added to export ratio means that the appreciation 
will have a lower pass-through rate into export prices. The less these prices rise, the 
less demand for Chinese exports, and hence Chinese value added, falls.
Matters become more complicated when three countries are linked via produc-
tion chains. For example, consider a scenario in which Japan exports computer 
parts to China, who then assembles them into a laptop and exports the laptop to 
the United States. If the Japanese yen depreciates against the US dollar (while the 
Chinese renminbi is fi xed against the US dollar), then this brings down the price 
of Chinese-assembled laptops in the United States. This implies increased demand 
for laptops, which generates additional demand for value added from the Chinese 
computer assembly industry. Thus, even though there is no bilateral movement 
in the renminbi–dollar exchange rate, vertical input trade linkages imply that 
exchange rates vis-a-vis third-country input suppliers infl uence export competitive-
ness and hence demand for one’s own value added.
As these examples illustrate, sorting out the effects of exchange rate movements 
(or other shocks to relative prices) on demand for exports and value added can be 
complicated. Fortunately, data on value-added exports can help cut through the 
fog. Since countries ultimately produce and trade value added, a natural approach 
would be to use price changes for value added originating from different countries, 
combined with trade weights based on value-added exports, to construct “real effec-
tive exchange rates” for value added (Bems and Johnson 2012).7 These composite 
exchange rate indexes capture the effect of changes in relative value-added prices 
on demand for value added from each country.
In practice, this value-added approach to evaluating exchange rate movements 
leads to quantitatively different conclusions than conventional approaches. For 
example, in Bems and Johnson (2012), we fi nd that, from 2000 to 2009, China’s 
7 Though value-added real exchange rates can be motivated directly by appealing to value-added models, 
in Bems and Johnson (2012), we derive value-added weights from a constant elasticity of substitution 
model written in gross terms under the assumption that elasticities of substitution are equal in prefer-
ences and production functions.
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value-added real effective exchange rate appreciated by 20 percentage points more 
than the conventional index used by the IMF. We also fi nd that appreciations in 
value-added exchange rates for the European periphery prior to the euro-crisis 
were larger than implied by conventional indexes. The value-added perspective thus 
indicates that China’s exchange rate has become less misaligned (consistent with 
rebalancing) and intra-EU rates were more misaligned (consistent with the build-up 
of imbalances within the European Union) than conventional indexes would indi-
cate. The most important reason for these differences is that conventional indices 
are constructed using consumer price indexes, which are poor guides in practice to 
how the relative price of value added across countries, and hence demand for value 
added, changes over time.
 Adjustment of Trade Imbalances
The geopolitics of external adjustment are often acrimonious. Not surprisingly 
therefore, the fact that bilateral trade balances are not equal in gross and value-added 
terms has attracted substantial attention in policy circles (Xing and Detert 2010; 
Lamy 2011; Johnson and Noguera 2012a). The value-added view of trade also has 
important implications for adjustment of multilateral trade balances—an insight 
that is less commonly appreciated, but perhaps of greater practical importance.
At the outset, it is crucial to emphasize that a country’s multilateral trade balance 
is identical when measured in gross and value-added terms. The national accounts 
GDP identity states that total value added produced minus total fi nal expenditure 
(including domestic and imported fi nal goods) is equal to the gross trade balance. 
Because all fi nal expenditure is ultimately value added purchased from some source, 
then this is the same as saying that value added produced minus value-added consumed 
(including domestic and imported value added) equals the gross trade balance. Since 
value added produced minus value added consumed is equal to value-added exports 
less value-added imports—that is, the value-added trade balance—the value-added 
trade balance equals the gross trade balance by construction.
This mechanical equality does not imply that the value-added view has nothing 
to contribute in analyzing external adjustment. To focus the discussion, consider a 
standard question asked by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005, 2007): how much does the 
consumption real exchange rate—that is, relative consumer price levels—need to 
change to close the trade imbalance? The answer to this question depends on whether 
one uses value-added or gross trade data in calibrating the underlying macroeconomic 
model. Bems (2013) points out three distinct channels that can lead to different results.
First, the economy looks more closed when one uses value-added exports to 
GDP, rather than the ratio of gross exports to GDP, as the measure of how much 
output is exported. With a more closed economy (equivalently, stonger home bias 
in consumption), the “transfer problem” associated with closing imbalances is 
worse. Specifi cally, the decline in home expenditure relative to foreign expenditure 
needed to close home’s defi cit leads to a larger decline in home’s terms of trade 
(the price of home relative to foreign tradables), thus increasing the size of the 
required real exchange rate change.
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Second, manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors look more similar in 
terms of openness in value-added terms. This tends to reduce the size of the intra-
national, cross-sector relative price adjustment associated with closing the external 
imbalance, and hence reduce the required real exchange rate adjustment. Essen-
tially, reducing the asymmetry in openness across sectors means that demand for 
output declines more uniformly across sectors (and hence cross-sector relative price 
changes are smaller) following the decline in home expenditure associated with 
closing the imbalance.
The third channel concerns elasticities, not openness. Typically, macro-
researchers plug elasticities (like the elasticity of substitution between home and 
foreign goods) that are estimated using gross data into value-added models. Bems 
(2013) argues this approach overstates the appropriate elasticities for cross-sector 
or cross-country substitution of value added. Converting the estimated gross elastici-
ties of substitution into levels appropriate for value-added models, he shows that the 
resulting value-added elasticities are lower than the gross elasticities typically used 
in the literature. Using these lower value-added elasticities increases the size of the 
real exchange rate adjustment needed to close imbalances.
How these channels net out depends on the particular country under examina-
tion. Bems (2013) works out the net effects for a range of countries. Not surprisingly, 
accounting correctly for intermediate inputs in calibration matters most for coun-
tries like China, Mexico, or South Korea that are deeply integrated into global 
supply chains. For a decline in the trade surplus equal to 1 percent of GDP, the 
real exchange rate appreciates by 15–25 percent more in a model parameterized 
to be consistent with the value-added data, relative to the conventional approach 
that mixes value-added and gross data. Specifi c numbers aside, this analysis points 
to the usefulness of looking at value-added export data in studying the mechanics 
of external adjustment.
Shifting our attention to the bilateral level, bilateral trade balances are gener-
ally not equal in gross and value-added terms. This is true not only if bilateral gross 
trade is unbalanced, but holds even if bilateral gross trade is balanced.8 For illustra-
tion, Figure  3 plots United States bilateral gross and value-added trade balances 
with China and the composite of Japan and South Korea using World Input-Output 
Database data. The US trade defi cit with China looks smaller in value-added terms 
than it does in gross terms, while the defi cit with Japan and South Korea looks corre-
spondingly larger. The maximal difference in percentage terms between the gross 
and value-added US–China imbalance is about 23 percent in 2004 ($124.5 billion 
versus $94 billion). In terms of absolute values, the gap peaks at $42 billion in 2007.
Almost surely, this fi gure understates the true reallocation of trade imbalances. 
The reason is that the World Input-Output Database (like most other available 
8 With balanced bilateral trade, differences in bilateral value-added to export ratios for exports from 
country i to country j versus from j to i can generate imbalanced bilateral value-added trade. With imbal-
anced bilateral trade, the average level of value added to export ratios for a given country pair will scale 
up/down the value-added imbalance relative to the gross imbalance ( Johnson and Noguera 2012a).
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input-output data) does not account for the high share of pure “processing trade” in 
Chinese exports. Specifi cally, just over half of Chinese exports are produced under 
its processing trade regime, where fi rms are allowed to import inputs duty-free if 
the resulting output is exported. Given these incentives, the imported input inten-
sity of these fi rms is substantially higher than the average Chinese fi rm. Standard 
input-output tables report input requirements for the average fi rm only, however. 
Therefore, they understate the import content of exports for China, and thus over-
state domestic value-added in Chinese exports.9
Adjusting value-added calculations to account for this bias, Koopman, Wang, and 
Wei (2012) fi nd that the Chinese domestic content in exports from the processing 
trade sector was only about 25 percent in 2002, as compared to about 90 percent 
for normal nonprocessing exports. Correctly accounting for these discrepancies 
9 Although I focus on pure processing trade here, the core idea is more general. Micro-data indicate that 
export and import participation are highly correlated at the fi rm-level. Therefore, the imported input 
intensity of exporting fi rms is likely higher than that of the average fi rm in most countries. As in the case 
of processing trade, ignoring this fact (as standard input-output tables do) leads one to overestimate the 
domestic value-added content of exports.
Figure 3
United States Trade Defi cits with China, Japan, and South Korea
Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and author’s calculations. Defi cits for Japan and South 
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lowers the ratio of Chinese domestic content exports from about 0.75 to 0.55 in 
2002. Drawing on this work, in Johnson and Noguera (2012a), we implement an 
adjustment for processing trade in China within the global input-output frame-
work and fi nd that it leads the China–US trade balance to shrink by an additional 
10  percentage points. Therefore, we fi nd that the difference between the gross 
and value-added US–China imbalance was actually likely closer to 30–40 percent in 
2004, roughly doubling the unadjusted calculation.
These adjustments to bilateral balances suggest that the burden of adjustment 
associated with closing the US trade balance would be redistributed away from 
China and toward Japan and Korea, in line with the reallocation of value-added 
trade balances. To date, however, there has been no work assessing how important 
these adjustments are quantitatively. This is a topic for future work.
 International Trade
Value-added exports also provide a new perspective on traditional topics in 
international trade. I highlight applications related to the impact of frictions on 
trade, specialization patterns, the factor content of trade, and trade policy.
 Trade Frictions
What is the impact of frictions—tariffs, nontariff barriers, transport costs, and 
others—on patterns of consumption versus production across countries? This ques-
tion is typically addressed by examining the effect of frictions on gross production 
and trade. As a result, we know a lot about where gross output is produced and the 
destinations to which it is shipped. We know very little, however, about how trade 
frictions infl uence trade in value added, and hence differences between where 
value added is produced versus where it is consumed.
To launch this discussion, it is helpful to refer back to the fi ve facts laid out 
earlier in this paper. We noted the signifi cant differences between bilateral gross 
and value-added exports, and that these bilateral differences are systematically 
related to common proxies for trade costs. For example, the ratio of bilateral 
value-added to gross exports tends to be lower for country pairs located in the 
same region, and pairs that are separated by shorter distances. It is also lower for 
pairs of countries that have adopted regional trade agreements, and even lower 
for pairs that have adopted “deep” agreements, such as customs unions, common 
markets, and economic unions.
These underlying patterns all suggest that trade frictions have different effects 
on value-added trade versus gross trade. One way to think about this is that stan-
dard trade frictions impede gross trade, and hence induce the patterns of fi nal 
and intermediate goods trade that we observe in the data. This trade in fi nal and 
intermediate goods gives rise to the global input-output structure. As we use that 
input-output structure to compute value-added trade fl ows, we are implicitly aggre-
gating the effect of frictions on gross trade to measure the composite impact of 
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those frictions on value-added trade. The input-output structure is a device to map 
gross trade frictions into implied value-added trade frictions, which measure the 
reduced form impact of the full set of gross frictions in determining value-added 
consumption patterns.
One insight from thinking through this aggregation process is that both 
bilateral trade costs and trade costs between third countries directly infl uence bi-
lateral value-added exports, whereas only bilateral trade costs directly infl uence 
bilateral gross trade (Noguera 2012). For this reason, value-added trade frictions 
are a manifestation not only of bilateral frictions, but rather the entire matrix of 
trade frictions among all countries.
Two points follow. First, one important reason that value-added exports are less 
sensitive to bilateral distance between countries than gross exports is that value added 
can be traded via third countries. For example, the United States can export interme-
diate inputs to Europe that are embodied in fi nal European goods shipped to Russia. 
In a sense, Russia is then effectively “closer” to the United States than it looks on a 
map. Second, changes in trade costs between third countries can have a direct impact 
on bilateral value-added exports to other countries. For example, a tariff cut between 
Japan and China would have a direct effect on value-added exports from Japan to the 
United States. This point has interesting implications for policy discussions, which typi-
cally focus on bilateral rather than third-country barriers. I return to this point below.
Turning from cross-sectional to time series facts, we have seen large declines in 
the ratio of value-added to gross exports over the past few decades, with particularly 
large declines in fast-growing emerging markets. An important question is: do changes 
in gross trade frictions explain this divergence? The answer, by and large, is yes.
Using a multisector gravity model with trade in both fi nal and intermediate 
goods, in Johnson and Noguera (2014), we decompose changes in the global 
input-output structure into components attributable to changes in trade frictions, 
changes in endowments and productivity, and changes in generic sector-to-sector 
input linkages or sector-level fi nal expenditure shares. We fi nd that changes in 
trade frictions explain nearly the entire decline in the ratio of value-added to gross 
exports for the world as a whole. We also explain differences across countries, where 
countries with large declines in trade frictions have seen particularly large declines 
in value-added relative to gross exports.
These results are consistent with the idea that value-added trade frictions have 
declined more slowly than gross trade frictions, leading to disproportionate growth 
in gross relative to value-added trade. Together with the discussion of bilateral 
differences, they point to new ways to think about the impact of frictions on trade.
 Specialization Patterns
As we have seen, the sector-composition of gross exports can be quite different 
than the sector-composition of value-added exports. Looking at value-added compo-
sition forces us to revisit what we know about patterns of specialization.
This point is driven home by considering the example of China. The top panel 
of Figure 4 records the share of individual sectors in Chinese gross and value-added 
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Figure 4
Sector-Level Export Shares for China
Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and author’s calculations. Export shares for all sectors 
are for 2008.
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exports. As in most countries, nonmanufacturing sectors are substantially more 
important in value-added than gross terms. The more striking fact is that the share 
of Electrical and Optical Equipment shrinks dramatically, from about one-third of 
China’s exports to just over one-tenth. This difference is of course consistent with 
the fact that these goods tend to be produced from imported intermediates that 
are assembled in China. Further, the bottom panel of Figure 4 plots the share of 
Electrical and Optical Equipment in value-added and gross exports over time. 
The share of this sector in gross exports has almost doubled since 1995, while the 
value-added share has barely changed. As such, gross and value-added trade provide 
very different pictures about what China genuinely produces and sells to the rest of 
the world.
This example illustrates a general point: what countries export may be very 
different from what they actually contribute to the production process. Countries 
that look like dominant exporters in particular sectors may in fact contribute very 
little value added to those exports. This basic point should be borne in mind in 
analyses of comparative advantage (Koopman, Wang, and Wei 2014). It should also 
factor into efforts to evaluate export sophistication across countries (Schott 2008, 
Wang and Wei 2010), or whether it matters for economic growth what countries 
export (Hausman, Hwang, and Rodrick 2007).
 The Factor Content of Trade
Thus far, we have focused on the value-added content of international trade. 
Beneath this trade in value added lies trade in primary factors or production tasks. If 
one knows the quantities of factors needed to produce a unit of GDP in each sector, 
then one can use these to convert value-added export fl ows into factor fl ows. The 
difference between the quantity of domestic factors needed to produce value-added 
exports and the quantity of foreign factors needed to produce value-added imports 
is equal to the net factor content of trade, which measures factors embodied in GDP 
minus factors embodied in consumption. Moreover, the preceding logic is identical 
if one uses task contents in place of factor contents.
Value-added export data are useful for performing factor/task content calcula-
tions for two reasons. First, using them sidesteps an important conceptual problem 
with conventional approaches to factor content calculations. Specifi cally, these 
approaches made strong, increasingly untenable assumptions—either that gross 
exports are produced entirely from domestic gross output, or that imported inputs 
are produced with identical input requirements as domestic output. Relaxing these 
assumptions requires tracking trade in intermediates across countries and sectors, 
just as global input-output frameworks are designed to do. Therefore, Reimer 
(2006) and Trefl er and Zhu (2010) proposed methods to compute the multilateral 
net factor content of trade (that is, the net quantity of factors each country exports 
to the rest of the world) using global input-output tables. While their approach 
cannot be used to recover bilateral factor trade, bilateral value-added export data 
can be used for this purpose. This is another advantage to using value-added 
data. Measuring bilateral trade in factors enables one to test bilateral predictions of 
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the factor-contents theory that emerge when factor price equalization breaks down 
(Debaere 2003; Choi and Krishna 2004).
What are the implications of using value-added exports to compute factor 
contents? The conventional approach overstates factor trade because it assumes 
that gross exports of a country are produced using that country’s technology 
alone. Instead, with traded inputs, gross exports of each country are produced 
using a convex combination of domestic and foreign technologies. By making 
effective production techniques more similar at home and abroad, traded inputs 
attenuate measured factor trade (Reimer 2006; Johnson 2011). Thus, appropriately 
accounting for intermediates lowers the measured factor content of trade relative 
to measurements that allow for differences in production techniques but do not 
incorporate traded intermediates. More work is needed to quantify the effect these 
adjustments have on tests of factor-contents theory.
 Trade Policy Analysis
The rise of global supply chains has altered the costs and benefi ts of protec-
tion in a variety of ways (Baldwin 2012; Blanchard 2013). Yet empirical research 
on two-way  interactions between trade policy and global supply chains is sparse. 
I expect that improvements in global input-output data and new measures of trade 
in value added will facilitate future work in this area. Therefore, I want to highlight 
a few specifi c ways in which the value-added analysis, and global input-output data 
more generally, can inform trade policy analysis.
First, the fact that gross exports and imports contain both foreign and domestic 
value-added is a core element of the value-added view of trade. The presence of 
domestic value added in imports gives rise to domestic constituencies that ought 
to favor liberalization. For example, exporters of intermediate goods that are then 
embodied in imported fi nal goods should favor lower tariffs on those fi nal goods 
imports. On the fl ip side, the presence of foreign value-added in exports ought to 
give rise to lobbying by exporters to liberalize imports of intermediates. As global 
supply chains become more important, these pressures should grow. With the new 
availability of data on input-output linkages across borders, the time seems ripe to 
investigate the role of these forces in determining trade policy.
Second, an important benefi t of value-added export data is that it tracks value 
added to the fi nal consumer even as it moves through third countries. This role for 
third parties has implications for trade policy. For example, a regional trade agree-
ment between countries A and B is likely to increase trade in value added between 
countries C and A when C is an input supplier to country B. This trade-creating 
effect of the regional trade agreement, and third-country liberalizations more 
generally, ought to fi gure into policy analysis.
Third, global input-output tables and value-added trade data can potentially 
help quantify the extent to which global supply chains magnify the impact of trade 
barriers, an effect which is reminiscent of an older literature on the “effective rate of 
protection” (Yi 2003, 2010). In models of multistage production, trade costs are paid 
multiple times as goods pass across borders through a global supply chain, and trade 
140     Journal of Economic Perspectives
costs imposed on the value of gross output impose a heavy burden when evaluated 
relative to the actual value added being traded. Building on this intuition, Koopman, 
Wang, and Wei (2014) call for value-added data to be used in quantifying these effects.
While the potential role of supply chains in magnifying trade barriers deserves 
attention, several caveats ought to be borne in mind. First, commonly used multisector 
models with “roundabout production” can match both gross and value-added trade 
simultaneously, yet they imply zero magnifi cation of trade barriers. Second, in Johnson 
and Moxnes (2013), we caution that even models with sequential multistage produc-
tion, which allow for magnifi cation effects, do not deliver signifi cant magnifi cation 
when calibrated to match observed levels of fi nal and intermediate goods trade. Given 
the potential importance of amplifi cation effects in understanding the costs of protec-
tion, this area demands more research.
 Concluding Remarks
The rise of global supply chains has led to far-reaching changes in the nature of 
international trade. In this article, I have focused on one particular implication: gross 
trade is not equal to trade in value added. While this fact has been known for some 
time, gaps between gross and value-added trade have only recently been quantifi ed. 
These gaps are markers for differences in global supply chain activity across coun-
tries and over time. They are also important to keep in mind in quantitative work. 
Researchers should beware of mixing gross trade data with value-added production 
data, or using gross trade data in applications where the underlying theory is based 
on value added concepts. For both these reasons, I expect value-added export data 
to fi gure prominently in international macroeconomic and trade research and 
policy analysis going forward.
Because research using global input-output frameworks is still relatively new, 
much remains to be done not only in analyzing trade in value added, but also with 
regard to improving the data underlying its measurement. Enhanced international 
cooperation to measure global supply chain activity more accurately would be ideal. 
Even in its absence, however, much could be done to improve measurement on a 
country-by-country basis. For example, value-added export measurement would be 
improved by additional work on quantifying differences in imported input use across 
exporting versus nonexporting fi rms and incorporating these into input-output 
tables. Enhanced data collection for countries with large “processing trade” 
sectors—like China, Mexico, and other emerging markets—would be a good start. 
Another issue that deserves attention is how we track imported input use behind 
the border. That is, we need better data on where inputs from particular source 
countries go (that is, which fi rms/sectors use them) after they enter the country. 
Addressing these issues would increase the accuracy of value-added measurements.
Finally, though I have focused on using global input-output frameworks to 
compute value-added exports, the underlying data is also valuable in other applica-
tions. Most obviously, the data can be used to parameterize trade models written in 
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gross terms with both cross-sector and cross-country input linkages. These models are 
useful in their own right. For example, trade policy is typically conducted using instru-
ments levied on gross trade, like tariffs, so it is natural to start by analyzing trade policy 
in gross models. Nonetheless, the deep goal ought to be to better understand how 
gross policy instruments induce changes in value-added trade, since value added is 
directly connected to both factor income and fi nal expenditure (and hence welfare). 
Accomplishing this goal requires a better understanding of the theoretical mapping 
between gross and value-added representations of international trade.
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